Improve or profit?: British intervention in old Delhi city, 1911-35

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Abstract
Conventionally, historians see the partitioning of Delhi into two opposing urban landscapes, of modern New Delhi / traditional Old Delhi, healthy/insalubrious as largely a consequence of the colonial state's preoccupation with the preservation of aesthetic ideals of New Delhi. Placing the characteristic traits of the colonial state at the centre of analysis - racism, limited liberalism, exercising both sovereign and disciplinary power - scholars contend that the vision of an imperial capital, designed to embody the political and aesthetic rationalities of British empire contributed largely in shaping the urban landscape of Delhi city in post-1911 period. In contrast this article aims to highlight the dilemmas that the colonial state encountered and took in to account, beyond merely the aesthetic considerations, in shaping the urban landscape of Delhi city. It also show how colonial state’s concern for profit contributed much more than the aesthetic imperatives in shaping the urban landscape of Delhi city as it grew westward.

Keywords: Delhi, Housing, British, Race, Class, Major Beadon, Slum

1. Introduction
The news of the transfer of the capital to Delhi in 1911, brought huge joy to Mr. J. Begg, the Chief Architect to the Government of India, since he thought his “really one big architectural opportunity” had finally arrived after many years. But, to his surprise, the government appointed Edwin Lutyens and Herbert Baker as the architects; and the refusal of the authorities to involve him in the project dashed Begg’s architectural ambitions. The Government’s reason for not making use of Begg’s “11 years of experience in India” was that the imperial capital was ‘work of special kind’ for which they needed the “best expert” [1]. This rejection stressed the exceptional nature of the project, since New Delhi was not only intended as a new administrative site but an imperial capital; the imagined future urban landscape held its own aesthetic and political meaning for British imperialism.

From the moment of transfer, the new capital at Delhi was envisioned as a symbol of British power, an expression of ‘an unaltering determination to maintain British rule in India’ [2]. From the selection of the site – historic Delhi –, ‘the site of ancient capitals of India’, to the contest over an architectural style that would most efficiently reflect the British Raj and present a hierarchically ordered urban landscape, the imperial capital was to be a ‘showcase of sovereignty’ [3]. While the carefully constructed spatial order, as envisaged in the plan of new Delhi city, embodied the imperial hierarchies and ‘situating sovereignty in a dense urban network of power relations’ [4]; the ‘rationally’ planned new housing and ‘modern’ urban environment with utilitarian principles at heart, was aimed at producing a ‘civilized modern subject’ [5]. New Delhi, as a vast body of literature on Delhi informs us, was imagined as an artefact to express and articulate the vision of British imperialism and an instrument to legitimise that imperialism itself. The building of the capital was to take some 20 years, yet what excited Viceroy Hardinge - the architect of transfer scheme - and his planning establishment could do, was to imagine the new capital ‘arising like a phoenix’ from the fields of Delhi.

However, as we know, the New Imperial Capital, despite being planned took unintended forms: its stated architectural intention of “peaceful domination and dignified rule over tradition and life of India” was undermined [6]; an urban form meant to transcribe the social hierarchies failed to perform efficiently [7]; and an authoritarian colonial regime which encouraged and imposed Euro-centric modernism, through modern urban housing, was
critiqued, resisted and negotiated to produce indigenous modernities [8]. To a large extent, the colonial masters accused the insanitary neighbour, the existing Delhi city, for the failures, whereas post independence historians accuse the colonial administration of deliberate neglect of Delhi city which had led to its congestion and unhealthy condition. They see the partitioning of Delhi into two opposing urban landscapes, of modern/traditional, healthy/insalubrious as largely a consequence of the colonial state’s preoccupation with the preservation of aesthetic ideals of New Delhi leading to the physical exclusion of Old Delhi, where the underfunded improvement programme did not bear any fruit. Placing the characteristic traits of the colonial state at the centre of analysis - racism, limited liberalism, exercising both sovereign and disciplinary power - scholars contend that the vision of an imperial capital, designed to embody the political and aesthetic rationalities of British empire contributed largely in shaping the urban landscape of Delhi city in post-1911 period [9]. In fact, they argue that New Delhi intervened in, impacted on and produced the inferior and congested neighbour.

To a large extent this narrative of New Delhi and Old Delhi as binaries is informed by Janet Abu-Lughod’s influential theoretical formulation of dual-city which suggests that in case of cities of colonized nations, colonial practices often produced ‘two quite different cities, physically juxtaposed but architecturally and socially distinct’ [10]. This formulation potently explains the logic of bifurcation, though it emphasises the theme of tradition and changelessness - ‘still essentially preindustrial in technology, social structure and way of life’ in making the native city legible [11]. At the same time, while emphasising the dominance of the aesthetic, in the case of New Delhi, it does not allow for dilemmas, contradictions and other considerations which breached the colonial state’s vision. In this chapter, I aim to highlight the dilemmas that the colonial state encountered and took in to account, beyond merely the aesthetic considerations, in shaping the urban landscape of Delhi city.

Though New Delhi was built with a consistent, coherent imperial vision, it was Delhi city that presented the urban planner and colonial administrator with dilemmas and anxieties well before the construction of the capital itself. The anxieties of an insanitary spillover was obliterated by confining the limits of Delhi city, yet the city demanded continuous attention of the administration for reasons of improvement, and resettlement and for the planning of extension, controlling lands and buildings, and to relieve congestion. For many administrators, improving Delhi City was a concern of the first order, while others pursued it with considerations of profit and economy. In fact, for the officials interested in profit, the land to the west of the Delhi city, which was now firmly in the control of government after acquisition, was the promise of wealth. This chapter argues that in the years 1911-35, these considerations contributed much more than the aesthetic imperatives in shaping the urban landscape of Delhi city as it grew westward. Rather than a causal connection, I would argue, that there was a discontinuous and porous connection between market and planning.

2. Promised Land

In October 1913, Patrick Abercrombie, the editor of Town Planning Review, reviewed the freshly minted Final Report of Delhi Town Planning Committee on Imperial Delhi. While he praised the planners for conceiving a bold scheme in terms of planning, he found the excessive ‘concentration on architectural display as an expression of dignity of the empire’ disappointing. In his view the major problem in the plan was the failure of the planner to conceptualise the new city from the perspectives of social structure and human nature and the inability to incorporate them. The stress on aesthetics, he noted, had ‘precluded them (planners) from giving much study to the problems of the individual and to the growth of the city as an organisation of social units’ [12]. The review, in particular, criticised the hierarchical segregation of the city into zones of ‘native clerks’, ‘Indian chiefs’, and ‘white man’ and the limited number of streets connecting the New and Old cities. Indeed, he considered that the latter would be a deterrent to the growth of the city [13].

Abercrombie’s judgement, however, was based on a faulty premise. He presumed the ‘New Capital as the extension of the Old city’ and we can see that much of his reasoning of the plan was based on this premise. Thus as mentioned earlier, he found the limited interaction between the New Capital and Old City as ill-thought and halting further growth and expansion. Similarly, referring to the Town-planning Movement in Europe whose chief feature was the study of human communities and human nature of city, he argued that the major lacuna of the plan was the complete absence of such thinking in plan [14]. A point reiterated some years later by Patrick Geddes on his visit to India [15]. However, Abercrombie’s judgement revealed that this artificial segregation of New Delhi from Delhi city through a policy of containment, limiting the interaction between the two cities, would create future problems. In the moment of its imagination, the review forecast that, the planners were laying the foundations of a contradiction; a contradiction between the aesthetic vision of the new imperial capital and future demands of the old and new cities.

Yet Abercrombie was not the first to raise such a concern. Ever since the Delhi scheme was first proposed, there were attempts by officers like G F deMontmorency and others to draw attention to this matter. They foresaw the expansion of Delhi city. Well aware of the fact that new capital would have its bearing on the old city, in March 1912 G F deMontmorency, the later head of Imperial Delhi Committee (IDC), suggested planning an extension in the west of old city for its expansion [16]. Narayani Gupta suggests that, this was the first serious attempt at long term planning of Old Delhi; nevertheless she reminds us that the ‘the combined fear of the old town encroaching and spoiling the symmetry of the new’ and an ‘Indian town polluting the Imperial one’ was the ground for it [17]. She is right in arguing that all this was conducted simply with a view to check the old city spilling over and into the new capital. However, I think, the proposal was also suspended within the delicate balance between the question of city aesthetics and a discourse of improvement for old Delhi.

In pleading for the Western Extension, deMontmorency highlighted the importance of the commercial standing of Delhi and cautioned that in failing to allow for an area of expansion, the presence of the new city would ‘check the commercial expansion of Delhi’ [18]. However, he did not see any merit in just simply providing an area for extension of the Delhi city and less inclined to leave this extension in the hands of Municipal Committee of Delhi. What he recommended, instead, was to plan the proposed extension of
Delhi city. Among the reasons he cited for the planning of the western extension, perhaps the most interesting and crucial was the following:

Are we going to allow the extension within this area to grow up and develop as it wills, only limiting and controlling the type of building put up under ordinary municipal laws? People will acquire isolated plots of land at different times and in different places as they come into market, and the result is likely to heterogeneous slums after the style of the present Paharganj extension [19]. (Emphasis added)

In highlighting the problem of Delhi in terms of its ‘slum’ like conditions, deficiency of municipal bye-laws and need for ‘controlling’ the future – an enduring motive of intervention in urban life -, the proposal explicitly articulated the intention and vision of improving Delhi city, though largely keeping the scheme for New Delhi in mind. Interestingly, deMontmorency’s reference to municipal bye-laws and slums of Paharganj was interesting since it saw the current problem of the suburbs arising out of the inept administration of Municipal committee, and visualized town-planning as a more effective solution to the problems. In making such a suggestion, deMontmorency repeated what Whitehead had proposed two years before that.

Home member Reginald Craddock also agreed with the deMontmorency suggestion of a planned extension for Delhi city. He noted that due to its proximity to the new capital, Delhi city’s population would definitely increase. Therefore an extension was essential for the relief of ‘congested conditions inside and outside the wall with a growing population’ and subsequent ‘operation of town planning’ [20].

Though the estimate from previous year suggested that the area required for the natural growth of Delhi city would be approximately 600 acres for the next fifty years, Craddock, taking into account the increase due to proximity to imperial city, recommended an area of 2500 acres for a more elaborate town planning scheme [21]. Despite the anxieties about an unhealthy city in the neighbourhood of New Delhi, the authorities’ desire to intervene in many ways also concerned itself with improving the older city. What emerges, then, is the intention of preserving the aesthetic of imperial city and the consideration of improving parts of old city was not opposed so much, as suggested by scholars.

Viceroy Hardinge’s warm backing for the proposed extension, ensured that the issue was addressed by the Delhi Town Planning Committee (DTPC). Subsequently, DTPC asked Special Land Acquisition Officer Major Beadon to prepare an estimate of certain areas in the west of Delhi city for the proposed Western extension. In his report on the estimate of acquisition of areas for new capital submitted in August 1912, Major Beadon earmarked three different blocks in the plan as an extension for both the new capital and old city [22].

In the plan, a huge tract surrounding the old city from north-west and north side was reserved for the expansion of the Delhi city by the name of Delhi City Expansion Tract. (see map below) The Delhi city expansion tract was a very heterogeneous landscape: in the north were the villages of Chandrawal, Timarpur, Wazirpur, Dhaka, Dahirpur, Jagatpur to be used for a temporary capital, rich vegetable gardens studded the landscape on the north-west, and finally to the west lay the parts Mauza Banskoli, Jehanumma and Sadhaura Kalan having city suburbs and agrarian tract of Firozabad Banger and Khandrat Kalan. The area of Khandrat Kalan was substantially large, with portions of it stretching till the boundary of the old city. Block C in the north-west corner of the new capital consisting of villages of Todapur, Dasghara, Shadipur and Khanpur Raya and Block D to the south of the future capital included all the villages between the Tomb of Safdarjung up to Mehrauli, was reserved for the eventual expansion of new capital. Block D was the largest expansion area of 13042 acres, covering all the area which is today (2014) form the part of south and Southern-West Delhi [23].

Map 2: Delhi and its Vicinity, 1910-11

Source: Hasan and Patel, Dilli to Delhi, (2014)
From the outset of the project, as argued in the previous chapter, the colonial government was concerned with the cost of project, and was not interested in acquiring all the areas before they required. Hence, in the case of the extension, they decided to first plan small areas between the two cities [24]. Thus, for the old city extension, an area to the west of Sadr Bazaar was to be acquired first, which was eventually called Western Extension. For the new capital, Block E to the south of old city was chosen. Most land in these areas was in one continuous stretch of suburban land west and south-west of the Delhi city, stretching from Sadr Bazaar in the north to Nizamuddin in the far south. Also a number of villages in these areas were enclosed in these blocks. The whole operation of splitting up the area into different blocks was unimaginative and mechanical, resulting in the artificial fragmentation of the entire suburban land of Delhi City. Suburbs like Mauza Narhaura, Paharganj, Karol Bagh, Jaisinghpura and Madhoganj, inhabited by poor classes were incorporated into the Imperial city tract (Block B). On the other hand, land to the north of these villages formed part of the Western extension; further south the adjoining area of Mauza Indrapat, parts of Khandrat Kalan and Arab Sarai went to the Block E [25]. It also meant disinlocating the poor classes from Paharganj, Karol Bagh, Jaisinghpura and Madhoganj suburbs and resettling them in the Western Extension [26].

Major Beadon’s report was one of the most thorough documents relating to the urban planning of the new city both in its scope and detail. This report meticulously described the pre-1911 landscape of Delhi, its complex land tenures, and reflected on the practical need for land for the new city, giving detailed commentaries on the nature of land, on questions of valuation, and on the possibility of higher compensation being paid if disgruntled land-owners went to court. There was another interesting aspect to the report, which showed that on many occasions, Beadon transgressed his defined province of acquisition and assumed the role of planner which is evident in the deft manner in which he dealt with the question of land.

In the report, the land was divided not only into different blocks for the capital project but they were also distinguished from each other on the basis of return the land in particular block would generate in future. Within every Block, the lands were further sorted on the basis of purpose they were to be used, and assured returns from it to government. Thus, in case of Block B he prophetically said; ‘I really cannot conceive that any land on which bazaars, shops, Indian residences would be allowed fetch less than Rs 1000 per acre’ [27]. Though the report was submitted before the selection of the southern site, it cannot be said that Beadon was not aware of the purpose for which certain lands were to be used. Yet, it was the very balance between an imagined future and the possible property values that formed the most fascinating feature of the report.

Major Beadon’s belief in the future that led him to deviate, on occasions, from the policies and plans of the ‘official’ planners. Thus he rejected outright the proposal to sell all the land at once, both in New Delhi and Delhi city. In digression from the DTPC proposal, he remarked ‘it would be advisable to give out to begin with rather a small area’, and ‘if the profits are good, future sites should be put to auction’ [28]. His concern was about the sale of land as a short-sighted policy and when it was clear that sooner or later the value of the property would rise, as he said, ‘there will be an expansion which will give rise to returns more than commensurate with expenditure’ [29]. He always anticipated the potential of land in an emerging property market.

He also did not desist from offering alternatives to the DTPC plan. Acquisition of Paharganj, for instance, presents one of the most interesting of all. The area of Paharganj was included in Block B and the cost of its acquiring it was really high (more than 27 Lakh). Initially, Major Beadon was against the acquisition of this area, for the reason that it was a residential and commercial suburb of the Delhi city and land was very valuable. He was convinced that ‘any acquisition of Paharganj must result in a dead loss to government, since there is no return at all’ [30]. Thus, at the first instance, Beadon suggested that the ‘insanitary plots’ of land in Paharganj must not be acquired, nor it would be financially remunerative ‘unless the scheme are radically changed’ [31]. But after pondering over the entire scheme, surprisingly, he favoured the acquisition. Beadon remarked if Paharganj is acquired, the expropriated landlords will take up the sites in Block B and the City Extension Tract, but that if it is not acquired and evacuated, there will be less immediate demand for sites in those area. In such circumstances the full premia and ground rents would not be obtainable so soon [32].

What we see in Beadon’s digression, and his suggestions and alternatives is wanton disregard of the DTPC plans: he was possessed by a desire for profit. While chalking out a plan for acquisition, his concern was to generate revenue from the land. Commenting on the figure that he prepared on the return value of the lands in Delhi, he said: ‘The simplest plan seems to be calculate what will be the value of this “possible tract” when it has been developed to the extent this report contemplates’ [33]. In the way Paharganj scheme was conceptualised, in fact, gives us a glimpse of the bearing that building projects could have on the future through anticipated property market. Acquisition of land for the new capital created a demand for landed property both in the new city and Delhi. In the building of Imperial Delhi, he saw an opportunity for the colonial government to profit from its real estate holdings after establishing control through acquisition over all the land both in the future capital and Old City. In his report, there was no differentiation between New Delhi and Delhi city; rather a distinction was made based on the value of property. In fact, Delhi was a promised land for his plan and in this enterprise, he was guided by the Home Member. In June 1912, well before Beadon’s report and the selection of the southern site, Mr Craddock, Home Member, sent a note broadly laying out the principle for the acquisition of land in general. The first two points outlined by him were: cheap acquisition of the land and control over the future acquisitions, which were broadly in line with state’s concern over the cost of project [34]. But, unexpectedly, these two were principles soon dwarfed by a third principle i.e. the approximate return from the land acquired. In fact, in all the reports that were prepared in connection with the land acquisition and subsequent allotment of land to the various government agencies directly or to the private interest through market, all land was classified and assessed according to its return potential in terms of return or future market-value.
extension was supposed to be for the poor and menial class classified as class III and Class IV land, even though the lands in western extension alone were respectively for Class III and Class IV lands (see Table 5). Prices to Rs 1000 per acre and Rs 10000 per acre were Rs 2500 per acre. One month later Beadon enhanced these prices to Rs 300 per acre and Class IV lands at Rs 2500 per acre. One month later Beadon enhanced these prices to Rs 1000 per acre and Rs 10000 per acre respectively for Class III and Class IV lands (see Table 5). However, the lands in western extension alone were classified as class III and Class IV land, even though the extension was supposed to be for the poor and menial class.

From the outset, it was clear that the space of Delhi would be metamorphosed. However, in the Home Member’s note, which tersely divided land into ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’, and classified it into categories of ‘class’, we see impulses, similar to Beadon’s, making the capital project a profitable enterprise. Even if this discussion was restricted to some colonial officials, it seems to be representative of the requisites of the colonial government and therefore a significant impulse within the process and policy of planning. A more explicit sense of this can be discerned in the dispute that arose within the Viceroy’s council over the allotment of land to private concerns.

One thing that made Viceroy Hardinge quite happy about his decision to move to Delhi – he was immensely tortured and exasperated by critique likes Lord Curzon for his Delhi scheme – was the large number of applications that Delhi office received for the grant of land in imperial Delhi. The applicants were big merchants, Rajas and Rais, men of influential social position and wealth, and educational and religious establishment. In April 1912, G F deMontmorency sent a letter to the Viceroy office to draw his attention to this issue and asked for the conditions on which land should be granted to non-officials and business concerns. After discussion between the DTPC and officials on this issue, it was decided that certain areas must be earmarked for Indian and non-official sections in the new capital. Accordingly, DTPC allotted a substantial land for this purpose in Block E and Block B. However, the officials were in disagreement about the conditions on which land should be granted.

On the issue of granting land to non-official concerns, Home Member Craddock was of the opinion that a priority must be given to the person who wants to build for their own residences. In addition, he also recommended that a limit should be fixed on the size of land any person could acquire in the new city. The idea behind this injunction was to deter speculators from acquiring the large swathes of land in the middle of the city. As he said, the maximum being fixed, so as to prevent too large compounds and the occupation of inordinate estates in the middle of the city. This allotment in a suitable way will be one of the most important duties that city commissioner will have to discharge.

Thus, in accordance with Craddock’s scheme, land meant for Govt building and official residence, with no return or little return on account of official accommodation was classified as Class I and Class II, but it was simply labelled as ‘wholly unproductive’. Class III and Class IV accommodation was considered more important in terms of returns, as they were for the residence of “private person including feudatory chiefs, Zamindars, raises, the merchants, hotels and so forth and new bazaars in Delhi” [35]. Craddock proposed that class III lands can be sold at Rs 300 per acre and Class IV lands at Rs 2500 per acre. One month later Beadon enhanced these prices to Rs 1000 per acre and Rs 10000 per acre respectively for Class III and Class IV lands (see Table 5). However, the lands in western extension alone were classified as class III and Class IV land, even though the extension was supposed to be for the poor and menial class.

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The argument for limiting the holding in the city or control to be exercised through building laws seems to suggest a strong emphasis on the aesthetic needs of the imperial city. Even the attempt to regulate the speculators from acquiring the large lands indicates a similar concern. Overall, it appears that the official policy was to offer land through market but simultaneously controlling the ‘figure of the speculator’ whose business practice could infiltrate the spaces of the city in the ways other than those conceived by the planner, leading to the dilution of the principle of the aesthetics. However, as far as Craddock was concerned, this was articulated from a very different perspective.

In making these proposals, he was less motivated by the question of aesthetics but a certain kind of uncertainty, an uncertainty over what ‘special value’ the land would acquire in future. ‘Great care will have to be exercised in the allotment’, he pointed, so that ‘land is not taken up in future. ‘Great care will have to be exercised in the allotment’, he pointed, so that ‘land is not taken up in future. ‘Great care will have to be exercised in the allotment’, he pointed, so that ‘land is not taken up in future. ‘Great care will have to be exercised in the allotment’, he pointed, so that ‘land is not taken up in future. ‘Great care will have to be exercised in the allotment’, he pointed, so that ‘land is not taken up in future.

Remark: The figures show immediate return from sale of the land. * - Rs 97 per acre represent the rent from agricultural lands that government re-let to peasants after acquisition.

Source: Report on the Acquisition of Land for Imperial Capital at Delhi, (August 1912)

<table>
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*Remark: The figures show immediate return from sale of the land. * - Rs 97 per acre represent the rent from agricultural lands that government re-let to peasants after acquisition.
these lands.
Craddock’s scheme and the final resolution of land allotment policy suggests that right from the beginning of this process there was a clear, and repeatedly articulated, obsession with the values of the properties that were to be designated for the purposes of the city planning. Even before construction began, as we shall see in Craddock’s classification, there was clear manifestation of this obsession in the way he marked the properties. It is this less remarked upon aspect that I would suggest had important repercussions on the ways in which not only New Delhi but also its neighbours were to develop and emerge.

Planning, then, was not independent of a profit motive but located in a more complex field. On the one hand, there was a concern for the improvement of the old city, if only to preserve the aesthetics of the future capital, which in turn meant that latter must be segregated from the ‘insanitary’ native city. At a different level, the political economy of a colonial state required that the colony should always be profitable [45]. The politico-aesthetic imperative, thus, must be located within these plural considerations in order to track how two cities emerged.

3. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to draw attention to the consideration which caused colonial authorities to intervene in Delhi city in the aftermath of transfer and the considerations which took lead in this process. The preservation of aesthetic principles of new capital from insanitary Delhi was the entry point of this intervention; however, the suburban landscape of Delhi city began to be more and more subjugated to the demands of generating revenue for the government. In fact, in the building of New Delhi, many officials saw an opportunity when government could benefit from its large landholding, the obsession with potential return from lands can be seen in the official plans and policies. While the official method of sanitary ‘improvement’ in Delhi city was concentrated on building new arteries for the circulation of capital, the acquisition of lands and series of demolition and resettlement plans for areas in the west of Delhi city created the demand for government lands. The policy of under-building in the new city for clerks, it appears, was directly related to desire for profit. Though the ‘needs’ of imperial capital demanded that such interest should concede ground to the aesthetics, the urban built environment of Delhi city in these years was largely generated and produced through the imperatives of economic gains. The insanitary and congested condition in Delhi in 1930’s was not caused by lack of attention or neglect but was the result of too much preoccupation of the urban built environment of Delhi city in these years was largely generated and produced through the imperatives of economic gains. The insanitary and congested condition in Delhi in 1930’s was not caused by lack of attention or neglect but was the result of too much preoccupation of colonial state required that the colony should always be profitable [45]. The politico-aesthetic imperative, thus, must be located within these plural considerations in order to track how two cities emerged.

4. References
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4. Legg, Spaces of Colonialism, Also see Anthony King, Jyoti Hosagahrah consider the organic and traditional space of Delhi as the sites where the first resistance to a colonial vision was encountered. Stephen Legg, Spaces of Colonialism. See the section on Local Resistance Communalism, and Religious Nationalism Hosagahrah’s thesis is conceptualised on the idea of cultural difference and resistance that a particular space offered to modern planning. Hosagahrah, Modernities, 111-148, 201.
5. Legg emphatically underscores this point. Legg, combining Foucault’s idea of governmentality with rich empirical material, produced an influential theoretical framework which explores the rationalities of colonial urban forms in New Delhi for exercise of colonial power. Legg, Spaces of Colonialism. See Chapter 1-Imperial Delhi, 4-34.
6. For a critique of this approach see Hosagahrah Modernities and Legg, Spaces of Colonialism
8. ibid
9. ibid
16. Weekly Note by G F deMontmorency, 21st March F. No 30, Home Department (Delhi Branch), 1912.
17. Narayani Gupta, Delhi Between Two Empires, 181.
18. Weekly Note by G F deMontmorency, 18th March F. No 52, Home Department (Delhi Branch), 1912, NAI, 1912.
19. Weekly Note by G F deMontmorency, 21st March F. No 30, Home Department (Delhi Branch), 1912, NAI, 1912.
20. Home Member R H Craddock’s Note, dated 4th April F No 52, Home Department (Delhi Branch), 1912, NAI, 1912.
21. Ibid, Craddock held that the extension was necessary because ‘expansion due to relief of congested areas inside and outside the walls, as the result of town planning operation and increase due to the proximity of the new Imperial Capital.’
22. Report on the Acquisition of Land for Imperial Capital at Delhi, F No 17, dated August 1912, Deputy Commissioner, DDA, hereafter Report Acquisition, 1912.
24. It was decided by Craddock that ‘whole area will not be built over immediately on acquisition’, thus lands in those outlaying blocks must be left with the peasants after acquiring them on the payment of rent. Home Member R H Craddock’s note on the acquisition of land at Delhi and return to be obtained from it to Major H C Beadon, Special Land Acquisition Officer, dated 19 June 1912, F No 15, Home Department (Delhi Branch), NAI, 1912.
25. The report gives a detailed description of most of the village in each block. In Banskoli (224 acres), Jehanumma (18 acres) and Sadahaura Khurd (371), were marked for the western extension. Report Acquisition, 1912, 14.
26. Letter from Office Secretary of State to Secretary, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, Government of India, April 1914, F No 194-195, Home Department (Public Branch), NAI, 1915.
27. Report Acquisition, 1912, 8.
28. Ibid see section on Returns from Block B, 11.
29. Ibid, 16.
30. Ibid, 28.
31. Though Major Beadon refers to certain alteration required in the scheme, it’s difficult to exactly point out his alternative scheme for the new city. Ibid, 12.
32. Ibid, 18.
34. Home Member RH Craddock’s Note on the acquisition of land at Delhi and return to be obtained from it to Major H C Beadon, Special Land Acquisition Officer, dated 19 June 1912, F No 15, Home Department (Delhi Branch), NAI, 1912.
35. Home Member RH Craddock’s Note on the acquisition of land at Delhi and return to be obtained from it to Major H C Beadon, Special Land Acquisition Officer, dated 19 June 1912, F No 15, Home Department (Delhi Branch), NAI, 1912.
36. Report Acquisition. The explanation given by Beadon for treating these lands was, as he put, ‘it is true that the settlement will accommodate to some extent the poorest and menial classes, but on the other hand, its proximity to the railways should lead to enhanced values for godowns and markets generally: there is no reason why the area should not become just as valuable as Paharganj land is at the present moment.’ In fact, out of 447 acre lands that were designated to be sold at Rs 10000 per acre, most of it was in the western extension, 1912, 14.
37. Letter G F deMontmorency to Secretary, Viceroy’s Office, dated 26 April, 1912, F No 8-9, Home Department (Public Branch), August NAI, 1912.
38. The issue was discussed in Viceroy’s Council and reference is to member of his council.
39. Letter Home Member R H Craddock to Secretary, Viceroy’s Office, dated 12 May, 1912, F No 8-9, Home Department (Public Branch), August NAI, 1912.
40. Ibid
41. Clark F No 8-9, Home Department (Public Branch), August NAI, 1912.
42. Letter Home Member R H Craddock to Secretary, Viceroy’s Office, dated 12 May, 1912, F No 8-9, Home Department (Public Branch), August NAI, 1912.
43. S A Imam’s Note, dated 20th May 1912, F No 8-9, Home Department (Public Branch), August NAI, 1912.
44. Recommendation of the Imperial Delhi committee regarding the terms on which land should be leased in New Delhi, dated 24th December 1915, F No 26, Home Department (Public Branch), Part B, August NAI. In the same file also see the note of Revenue Department, 1915.