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Pakistan's nuclear doctrine and Indian security: An analysis

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Abstract

This paper analysis Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy from the perspective of its security and discuss its nuclear doctrine, its nuclear strategy in the context on the Indian security. The ambit of the paper further includes the impact that Pakistan's nuclear weapons became a key to an assertive posture in Kashmir. This paper also discusses about the concept on nuclear deterrence and the security of Pakistan. Many Pakistani defense analysis see both deterrence and security as anonymous. This paper analysis Pakistan's nuclear strategy in the context of its threat perception, it's plan to achieve parity with India and its objective after the tests to portray Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint to persuade the world community's indulgence and intervention to resdue the issue.

Keywords: Deterrent against India, self-reliance, leadership of Islamic world, national pride

Introduction

This research paper seeks to Pakistan's nuclear doctrine and its impact on Indian security. The nuclear doctrine of Pakistan is a theoretical concept of Military strategy that promotes that promotes deterrence by guaranteeing an immediate massive retaliation to an aggressive attack against the state. Pakistan first tested nuclear weapons in May 1998 in response to nuclear tests by its regional rival, India. So, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine aims to deter India from committing aggression against Pakistan and to prevent an Indian victory in the event of a war. In last two decades Pakistan's nuclear doctrine suggests it's position has remains constant on some issues has been subject to ongoing disputes on other issues, and has been constantly evolving on still others. For example, issues like the possibility of nuclear first use and a unilateral moratorium against nuclear testing remain constant. Minimum credible deterrence and basing the nuclear posture on non-deployment and de-mated weapons are some of the disputed issues.

Pakistan's new missiles Shaheen 3 and Nasr missiles as evidence on a changing nuclear use doctrine, on March 9 2015, Pakistan's Inter Services Relations Agency announced the successful test launch of Shaheen 3 surface to surface ballistic missile capable to reach 2,750 kilometers. The Pakistan's National command authority Khalid Kidwai said the Shaheen 3 missile is meant to reach India's nascent strategic bases on the Andam and Nicobar Islands. The purpose is to deny India a second-strike capability.

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine fully linked with India's security. Although Pakistan claimed that its nuclear program was only pursuing peaceful applications of atomic energy, there were signs that its leadership had other intentions. This fact was particularly evident in wake of the 1965 Indo- Pakistani war which ended in a normal victory of India." If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of the our own." Proclaimed then minister of foreign affairs Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

The two aspects of his statements are important- first, its linkage to India, second, his emphasis on atomic bomb as the ultimate weapon.

Nuclear test of Pakistan

During the nuclear test of Pakistan prepared for possible testing, project officials selected the Raskoh Hills in the southwestern province of Baluchistan province as a test site.

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Pakistan also vastly improved its missile technology, developing the Gauri medium-range ballistic missile a derivative by the North Korean Nodong. Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif faced enormous pressure to authorize nuclear tests after India conducted its own test in 1998. Finally, Pakistani officials went ahead with preparation for the test code named Chagai-1 when Sharif gave the order "Dhamaka kar dein" on May 28, 1998- less than three weeks after India's nuclear tests – Pakistan exploded its first device at the Raskoh test site. "Today, we have settled a score and have carried out five successful nuclear tests".

Announced Sharif Pakistani Doctrine

Unlike India, Pakistan does not have a no first doctrine regarding its nuclear arsenal. After the 1998 tests, Prime Minister Sharif said, "in the interest of national self-defense to deter aggression, whether, nuclear or conventional." In 2002 president Pervez Musharraf declared that Pakistan would respond with full might if attacked.

Pakistan redefined its nuclear doctrine and set minimum credible deterrence. In May 1999 as its principle. Since then the policy of minimum credible deterrence has been reaffirmed constantly.

It is based on four objectives -

1. Deterrence of all forms of external aggression
2. Building of both conventional and strategic forces
3. Avoid pre-emptive strike through protection and the threat of nuclear retaliation
4. Stabilizing strategic deterrence in South Asia

The level of minimum deterrence has never been defined precisely in number. This is because Islamabad believed the minimum deterrence can change over time in the light of evolution of the threat.

Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore agreement between Prime ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's incursion in to Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.

Pakistan's stand on CTBT and NPT

According to the defense department report 2001, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the treaty. Consequently not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards Pakistani officials have stated that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus any connection with India's decisions." Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as evidenced by president Pervez Musharraf's statement in May, 2002 Musharraf said that Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear- armed rivals, he would "respond with full might." These statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

According to the above statement we can say very easily that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine fully implemented in the reference of India's national security. Pakistan's nuclear policies first agenda to deter India conventional as well as nuclear aggression and the next is if deterrence fails is to deny India victory in the event of a war.

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