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## Faith and religious truth

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### Abstract

This article focuses the relation between faith and religion and their impact on 'Theo'. This study will help you understand that even if we don't know or have good grounds for believing, that our central religious affirmations are true, we still can have good reasons for believing in god.

**What is Faith?:** According to Christianity, Faith refers to believing in god's promises, trusting in his faithfulness and relying on god's character.

**What is Religious truth?:** It is the truth that can be set ahead in the form of general propositions. Christian truth tells us about how Jesus Christ teaches us God and Man duty.

**Relationship between Faith and Religious truth:** Knowing the religious truths but not having faith on god or in religion doesn't makes us a complete person. Establishing a relation between faith and religion helps us to conclude the relation between faith and religious truth.

**Conclusion:** The study helps us to understand the importance of relationship between faith and religious truth. Both are equally important in human life.

**Keywords:** Faith, religion, Christianity, theology, truth

### Introduction

The Practice of religion is usually said to involve 'faith' of Some Kind, but that sort of faith is needed for the Practice for religion, and what sort of faith ought churches to demand of their members? Faith certainly seems to involve trust in God and commitment to Him, but what does such trust amount to? Does it involve believing that there is a God and believing certain truth about Him: and, if so how strong do these beliefs have to be? If the trust can exist without belief, is it rational to put your trust in God without the belief that he exists? And, anyway, what is to believe that there is God, and when would it be rational for a man to believe that there is God? Finally, when faith in God is obligatory and when is it rational? Let us discuss that properly.

Although we have no knowledge about the truth of religious approaches, can it be possible that it is reasonable to accept the core claims of Christianity even without sufficient evidence for their truth? [01] Allen argues in his enterprise is no less than to present "a case for the reasonableness of adherence to God----- by enlarging our notion of reasonableness' or 'rationality' [02], "Though it is indeed part of his case here to establish that this enlargement is thoroughly non-arbitrary one. His central claim" is that the satisfaction needed is a sound ground for the affirmation of religious beliefs." Allen is well aware that this has a puzzling ring for usually satisfaction gained from belief is not a sound ground for the affirmation of that generalization and that belief in the Judeo-Christian God is a member of this class.

Allen claims this against the background of a specific stage in the development of the argument between belief and in belief, the religious and theological atmosphere is such that it is almost universally believed that there is no sound argument for the existence of God and that applies to revelation, religious experience and faith are all at best inconclusive. Given such intellectual conviction religious belief appears to be irrational: an absurd leap in the dark. But if that is what the situation actually is, such Knightsmanship is certainly in various ways unsatisfactory [03]. Faiths is surely in need of a better defence than that Allen attempts to provide one.

It is his belief that the usual defence of the reasonableness of faith moves in the wrong direction. He urges that even if we cannot know of good grounds for believing that our central religious affirmations are true, we still can have good reasons for believing in God and Christian doctrine on "the basis of needs which they satisfy". He claims that "reason

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does have its uses in religion. But its role need not be that of seeking to establish the truth of religious beliefs" [04]. His aim is the demanding and crucial one of establishing the reasonableness of Christian belief." Without the need to argue for God's existence, to show that Christian thesis is the best metaphysical position or to purge it of all metaphysical elements" [05]. His central claim is that "as long as there are no reasons which Count Decisively against the truth of his religious beliefs, the fulfilment of his needs which lead him to respond with faith and to retain his faith can be a reasonable ground or basis for him to adhere to religious belief and to assert them as true" [06].

It should be noted that he is claiming that "Faith is a sound ground for religious truth claims independent of reasons which count toward establishing their truth." [07].

What in Allen's Judgement are the distinctive needs satisfied by religious belief? He reminds us initially that "unless there is a distinctive range of needs, there is great force in the view that religious beliefs are Psychological projections: a view that would under time my thesis that the fulfilment of needs is a sound ground for religious belief" [08]. There is, however, he avers, a distinctive range of hopes and aspirations as well as fears that arise from aerating the 'word of God.' One comes to fear, the judgment of God, hope that one may escape death and "lives as a son in the fellowship of God," and one comes to yearn for a righteousness and a purity of heart which we know is beyond our powers of attainment but which, with God's grace, we trust we shall attain" in the Kingdom that shall come." These needs are all distinctive religious needs and can arise only with the hearing of the word of God.' That is to say, we come to have a need for a certain Kind of Judgment on Our lives, a certain kind of moral purity and these are all distinctive religious needs.

However, if belief in God is like belief in the Easter Bunny, if, that is, Christian religious truth-claims are not true, their needs will not be satisfied. We need not only to believe that there "is a redeeming God who will give us an eternal home with him" but this actually must be so if religious needs are to be fully met. Such a claim both creates needs e.g. the need to attain moral purity and satisfies some needs e.g., it will enable "a man to pull a broken or ensnared life together" [09]. with the work of Feuerbach and Freud in mind, Allen raises the questions of "other things. Besides, religious beliefs may arouse these needs and satisfy them." [10] His answer is that the needs we have discussed are not needs "common to the human conditions" and "hence the beliefs cannot be projections arising from our needs as human beings. That is, we cannot create the beliefs, since it is they that create the needs," [11]. But this seems to me to overlook the modification of Feuerbach made by Marx and The modification of Freud made by the Freudian anthropologist Weston Labara. When we consider the particular culture in which Christianity Flourishes with its Patriarchal family structure, the dehumanization and deprivation of great masses of men in the face of the fact that there are needs, and indeed even wants, which are Common to nearly all men, the particular needs most of us have in such a cultural complex can be explained, pace Allen, without any transcended reference [12]. The need for a Judgment of God' can readily be explained by reference to our Patriarchal family structure. The hope of somehow escaping death is a very wide spread cultural artefact. And is quite understandable without reference to God. That it takes the

form that it does in Christianity again can be explained by reference to the peculiar family structure, the oedipal complex and the need for some eschatology to serve as an opiate for a sorely pressed animal in a hopeless condition of exploitation. Finally our desire for moral purity, together with our conviction that with God's grace it can only be attained 'in the life to come' can be explained on a combination of Marxian and Freudian grounds and in terms of our Psychological awareness of moral failure, together with the hope, implicit in the Very concept of motility of overcoming that failure. Conceptualizing that need Just as Allen does though such a conceptualization is by no means necessary we will come to see that of course it is only fully certifiable if religious beliefs are true perfect moral purity is not the sort of thing we are going to attain: but there are degrees of purity and there is the crucial kind of purity that goes with moral integrity which may be attainable or at least approximately even in a world without God. What is important to see is that changes in social conditions, expectations and culturally distinctive features, modify radically certain needs and wither away certain wants without its becoming the case that less sense can be made of life. Moreover, the changes can be attributed to changes in specific cultural dynamics, e.g., family structure. Given such an alternative account, the Psychological Projection theory, though far from perfect, remains (to put it minimally) at least as plausible as an alien's account [13].

However, all this aside, it is still correct to maintain as Allen does, that we do believe in Christianity as we come to believe in many other things through training in a social group. What is distinctive about Allen's account is his claim that "a person could legitimately cite only this training and its consequences as a reason why he is a Christian ---" [14]. A person's reason here, Allen claims, is a motive for adherence to religious trust - claims." At the core of this motive would be the fact that he finds himself a man with faith-----" [15].

Unless there are actual challenges to such a faith, his motive is sufficient for remaining in faith: it is not necessary to give rationales, for such a believer" has come to have faith in response to the witness of the Christian community and in the condition of faith he finds his soul nourished." [16]. In such a context, he finds his life transformed in a highly desirable fashion and this is the ground for his religious belief. It is not an irrational leap in the dark.

Again Allen Argues that even if there are actual reasons for doubt, motive alone could serve as supporting ground for belief. This type of appeal to motive would in turn indeed be justified by showing that the challenges to religious belief are ill- founded: the rebuttals to the challenges being cited as the reason for continuing to believe in the face of a challenge to one's belief [17]. But the motive of one could still be an actual reason for one's belief: Just like one's fondness for a person may remain the actual reason (motive) why a person is your friend even though you offer evidence to rebut a challenge to that friendship.

If we consider that a Christian has rationales for his belief, they are reason for his belief in the sense that in the face of internal and external challenges they give him reason for turning back a claim that Christianity is absurd. However, "the actual and decisive reason for belief is still that a man finds himself believing, responding with faith to religious truth-claims." [18]. The rebuttal shows that he may rightly continue to adhere to his faith. However, the "challenges do

not reveal gaps in motives: motives are not the sort of things which have 'gaps' revealed by challenges and filled by rebuttals." <sup>[19]</sup>. The actual foundation for religious belief is the nourishment one receives by one's faith. Religion, we must remember, is not a theoretical activity but is the medium of man's salvation and redemption. The function of rebuttals, frequently carried out by philosophical argument, is not to give "the real foundation" of faith but to "deal with challenges to the truth of religious beliefs which are affirmed by faith." <sup>[20]</sup>. Rebuttals endorse the achievement that results from his faith; they are not 'the true road' to his achievement. Taking what he takes to be fundamental truth claims of his faith, a Christian must believe that there is an answer to every challenge to his faith. His every religion has taught him how to live with unmet challenges. His faith still has a ground, for it is still answering to the fundamentals. Needs Rather he is faced with "the choice of whether or not this nourishment is sufficient to enable him to live with a doubt he cannot resolve or a challenge he cannot rebut." <sup>[21]</sup>. Whether the truth - claim is true matters to the believer. This supposedly does not obtain in the other case "the reminder of the Source of the Judgement does not have the tendency to cause one tendency to cause one to consider withdrawing the judgement: <sup>[22]</sup>. In fine, the source for believing a truth-claim may also be the ground for believing that truth - claim where <sup>[1]</sup> there is no decisive evidence that the truth-claim in question is false and <sup>[2]</sup> Where the truth of the truth-claim matters to the needs which motivate the assertion of the truth-claim. Here there is a great difficulty in Allen's account. He stresses that Christian faith satisfies certain very fundamental needs. For example, we have a deep desire to attain moral purity and belief in God Satisfies that need. If we have such a faith we will not fall into despair, for we believe that it is true that God is our redeemer. But Allen fails to note that to escape such frustration, we need only believe the control claims of Christian are true, they need not actually be true. So it is not the truth or even the Probable truth of the religious truth. Claims which satisfy that need, but the belief no matter how ill- founded that they are true. Indeed if the putative religious truth claim that God is our redeemer is false, we will never actually, attain moral purity, but we can, by accepting it, whether it is true or false or even neither true nor false, satisfy the central need that faith answers to, namely the need to pull ourselves together So that we have the hope of the redemption of our broken and ensnared lives.

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