



ISSN Print: 2394-7500
ISSN Online: 2394-5869
Impact Factor: 5.2
IJAR 2018; 4(9): 234-235
www.allresearchjournal.com
Received: 07-07-2018
Accepted: 09-08-2018

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Cold war between states with nuclear weapon

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Abstract

The main extract of this article is that how cold war occurred between states with nuclear. For the study of present topic the investigator used the analytical methods for this article by reviewing relevant publications, primarily based on the online journals available on Internet, Wikipedia, Elsevier and Journal of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and other related literature.

Keywords: Cold war occurred between states with nuclear

The countries of the third world have been manufactured into diverting their resources to the purchase of sophisticated weapons manufactured in US. In South Asia it plays an important role through Pakistan.

Having been in the strategic wilderness for more than a decade, the South Asian region is again becoming an area of geopolitical rivalry among world powers and regional states. The region was also an area of rivalry between Soviet and US forces during the period of the Cold War.

Defining the term 'cold war' with some care. Strictly speaking, a cold war may occur between any two entities who are at loggerheads but do not fight. The term owes its current usage to Walter Lippmann, who popularized it in 1947, but it is known to have been used much earlier by the Spanish writer Don Juan Manuel, who likened the conflict between Christendom and Islam to a cold war. I confine myself to treating as cold wars those conflicts that occur between nuclear-armed states. The point is vital. Pre-nuclear cold wars were a matter of choice for the participants. One or the other could have chosen to fight.

Nuclear cold wars do not realistically offer the luxury of that choice. Because of their immense destructive power, nuclear weapons have a distinctive quality about them, and it is vital to observe and draw lessons from how nuclear rivals interact, for almost nothing worries us more than the prospect of a nuclear war. While much attention has understandably been paid to the problem of stability between nuclear rivals, it is time to go beyond the debate to grasp the wider influence of nuclear weapons on the dynamics of inter-state rivalry. The short definition above – that cold wars are tense but war-less confrontations between states with nuclear weapons – serves only as a starting point.

Cold wars are produced by powerful ideational and material factors. Differences in the realm of thought – ideational differences encompassing ideology and identity – underpin the rivalries between nuclear-armed states, creating and sustaining mutual resentments, hostility and strong threat perceptions.

Nuclear weapons have complex modifying effects on this politics. Initially, the nuclearization of a hostile relationship generates intense antipathy, raising the temperature since nuclear weapons are central to cold wars, it is important to come to grips with the ways in which they shape the behavior of states. Most discussions on nuclear weapons are justifiably focused on the question of whether they have stabilizing or destabilizing effects. Optimists believe they have stabilizing effects because they inhibit fighting and engender caution. Pessimists believe they have destabilizing effects as their existence poses grave risks of losing control owing to failures of organization and control.

Strategic theory relating to nuclear weapons provides the general principles of deterrence and war, including answers to basic questions such as: what are the requirements of deterrence; how much damage should one be able to do in order to deter an adversary? It reflects on key

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Issues about relative balances of capability, issues of credibility, the prerequisites for stability, and the relationship between nuclear war and lower levels of armed conflict.

United States and nuclear China were caught up in a bitter quarrel during the 1960s, while at about the same time and stretching well beyond, the Soviet Union and China also entered a phase of angry confrontation. The next cold war involved India, but was some time in coming. Though India became a nuclear-capable power in 1974, it made no effort to translate its wherewithal into actual weapons for another decade and a half. During this period, its relationship with China was extremely tense at times, but within the terms of our definition, this was not a cold war, because India never produced nuclear weapons. Had it done, we may have had a cold war between these two nations, for there were certainly many elements of rivalry and competition between them, including a border dispute, a history of war, and a prolonged border confrontation between their armed forces in 1986–87.

The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of the fourth cold war, this time between India and Pakistan. The India–Pakistan relationship has had the characteristics of cold war from the time when both were incipient nuclear-armed states in the late 1980s, and remains mired in discord today.

By the turn of the twentieth century, yet another cold war emerged, between the United States and North Korea, again one which had a long gestation period while the North Koreans played hide and seek with respect to their nuclear capability. We have, then, a number of cold wars to compare. And to all appearances, there are more on the horizon. North Korea's nuclear test in 2006 raises the prospect of a cold war between North Korea and Japan.

The United States in Latin America, Korea, and Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. The politics of the Cold War was intensely competitive and played out on a global scale. From time to time, the two sides came close to war and were involved in a series of crises, most notably in Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962, and the Middle East in 1973. In the first of these, President Kennedy actually discussed the possibility of war, including the feasibility of a nuclear first strike, but drew back because there was no certainty that it could be controlled and prevented from escalating to a nuclear exchange. The decision was taken not to risk nuclear war in spite of the knowledge that American forces were far greater in quantity and quality than those of the Soviet Union.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, which stood face to face, with large conventional and nuclear arsenals in the middle of Europe. Across the globe, the two competed for influence in Asia, Africa, and to a lesser extent in Latin America. When things did not go their way, they intervened forcefully:

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