



ISSN Print: 2394-7500
ISSN Online: 2394-5869
Impact Factor: 8.4
IJAR 2022; 8(12): 299-305
www.allresearchjournal.com
Received: 23-11-2022
Accepted: 22-12-2022

Dr. Seema Thakran
Associate Professor,
Department of History, TDL,
GCW, Murthal, Sonipat,
Haryana, India

A study on Jallianwala Bagh massacre

Dr. Seema Thakran

Abstract

This article examines the Amritsar Slaughter of 1919, one of the most infamous episodes in British imperialism, from the viewpoint of the British Army's concept of employing the minimum amount of force required to achieve objectives. The massacre has been remembered ever since it happened as the worst failure to use little force in British Army history. For those who did not agree with Brigadier General Reginald Dyer, the massacre at Amritsar may have seemed like the insane actions of a bloodthirsty fool. The notion of civic-military links was likely well established at the time of the war, since the idea that a civil judge and a military commander should work together to put down a riot is indicative of this. However, the local Amritsaris definitely turned over city governance to the military forces without playing a direct involvement in the events leading up to that point. It's possible that reluctance to become engaged, ignorance of obligations, or both played roles here. There's no denying that the military has assumed civil authority in this city. In this study, the commonly held idea that the murder at Amritsar was an example of the ineffectiveness of utilising little force is challenged via a fresh look at the arguments surrounding the killing and the role of Brigadier-General Dyer.

Keywords: Amritsar massacre of 1919, Reginald Dyer, British raj, civil-military relations

Introduction

On the exact same date in history 99 years ago, on April 13th, 1919, it occurred on the beautiful sunny afternoon of Baisakhi, which is a holy day in the Sikh faith. The day also marked the beginning of spring. Over 20000 unarmed men, females, and youngsters from different regions of Punjab came together at Jallianwala Bagh to participate in a peaceful protest in the middle of a volatile political climate. They were going to hear a public address regarding the very contentious Rowlatt Act, which was frequently referred to as the Black Act back then and is still commonly referred to by that name today. This act effectively made it permissible to imprison Indians on any fanciful or groundless notion. Jallianwala Bagh had become a central focus in the national mind of India and the rest of the globe in the span of 20 minutes, during which 1,650 rounds of gunfire were fired. Because it was the site of a terrible tragedy and had immediate political significance, Jallianwala's future as a commemoration area was nearly a certain conclusion.

Hundreds of unarmed protestors were shot and killed here by British forces headed by Major General Dyer in 1919. If your high school history textbook covered the events of 1919, including the slaughter at Jallianwala Bagh, then you will recognise this site. Plaques around the well indicate the locations from where the shooting was ordered, and another nearby memorial claims that more than 140 corpses were recovered from the pit. According to the inscription placed next to the well, its depths were filled with the remains of victims who had leapt in to escape the gunfire.

Look into the martyrdom's well, where scores of people jumped to escape the gunfire but were drowned, only to be fired at. These two locations successfully resurrect this time in Indian history. Indeed, we have learnt about the horrors that took place in Jallianwala Bagh. However, you won't be able to properly time travel by just reading about a historical event. One must visit the site of the tragedy to really comprehend it and feel for the victims. Moreover, we should never forget the sacrifices they made so that we might live freely and safely in our country.

The massacre that did take place in the Jallianwala Bagh in Punjab is among the most horrifying things that comes to mind while thinking about historical occurrences. On April 13, 1919, hundreds of innocent people were mercilessly slaughtered at this terrible location by British forces led by General Dyer. These atrocities took place on the spot. A monument to those who perished in the Jallianwala Bagh massacre may be seen at this location today.

Corresponding Author:
Dr. Seema Thakran
Associate Professor,
Department of History, TDL,
GCW, Murthal, Sonipat,
Haryana, India

The monument is considered to be of national significance. Following the terrible events of that day, a group was formed to gather money for a monument to be dedicated to the victims of the slaughter. The site, which encompasses 6.5 acres, was purchased by the government in the year 1920, and it wasn't until 1961 that the monument, which is in the shape of a city park, was inaugurated. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the first Governor of an independent India, presided over the ceremony that marked the memorial's official opening. As soon as one steps into the garden, a wave of melancholy washes over them. The walls littered with bullet holes, the blazing light, the very well, and the other elements of the setting all represent India's fight for independence. The suffering caused by those who were slain is just beyond measure. It was a driving force in India's fight for independence from British rule. The British at the time believed that this was nothing more than an isolated occurrence. People would eventually forget about it and go on to other things. On the other hand, this event turned out to be a crucial turning point. Indian nationalists first started calling for the expulsion of the British from India during the refusal to cooperate campaign and the khilafat movement. After the tragedy at Jallianwala Bagh, political leaders began calling for Purna Swaraj, which translates to total independence. Earlier generations of politicians desired some kind of participation in governance as well as equal rights and opportunities. What happened after that, as the saying goes, is now part of history.

When I was walking around the Bagh in the morning, I couldn't help but wonder about how much of an effect such a little site, which is only approximately six acres in size, had on the psyche of the whole country of India. Why and how did individuals from cities like Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta — all of which are extremely far away from this location — become so worked up over what was going on here? After all, the majority of Indians were not linked to the deceased and in many cases were unaware of them. Furthermore, a significant portion of companions did not have any familial ties to the inhabitants of Amritsar or the Sikhs and lacked even the most basic familiarity with either group. However, for some reason, this one event — and clearly, the scale of it — brought the people together in their fight, and as a result, the greatest kingdom the globe had ever witnessed was brought to an end in fewer than thirty years, successfully bringing it back to life in the process. Both of these sites are located in the same garden. We have all learned about or read about the atrocities that occurred in Jallianwala Bagh. The bare facts of a historical occurrence, on the other hand, are not enough to effectively transport you back in time. A trip to the scene of the tragedy is required in order to really understand and empathize with those who were affected by it. And to always keep in mind that they gave their lives for us, for our freedom, and for the society that we are able to enjoy so peacefully now.

Individuals like us who were born in a more wealthy India after the country gained its independence are unable to comprehend how profoundly racist and prejudiced our country's former British rulers really. Or how detrimental their two-century-long tyranny was to the place we inhabited. White people, who considered themselves more civilized simply due to the color of their skin, kept Indians under their dominion solely on the grounds of racism, which was as shockingly horrible as Hitler's plan to create a master race. This led to the subjugation of the Indian people.

The murder area known as Jallianwala Bagh is just as emblematic of the wound the British imposed on India as, for example, the German concentration camps in Germany communism. Jallianwala Bagh is located in the same city as Auschwitz.

The steps the British government took in the wake of the massacre prove this beyond a reasonable doubt. Not until the month of December 1919 did the English people learn the full extent of the catastrophe. Michael Dwyer, County Executive of the Punjab, reportedly told General Dyer, "Your action is appropriate," as per the Lt. Governor shares this view. In spite of the catastrophe, Dyer continued to sow terror across Amritsar by issuing additional draconian decrees.

Dyer was under the impression that he did not need medical attention for the injured. He then made the astounding declaration, Definitely not. It was not part of my duties. They might have gone to any of the hospitals that were open at the time. 1 Dyer did not face any repercussions for his actions from the Board; nonetheless, he was eventually removed from his position. However, he did not go back to England as the Slaughter of Amritsar; rather, he did so as a true champion. Many people believed that he was the one who had put a stop to a revolt. The conservative as well as Individual who saved India and the Savior of the world of the Punjab. The Daytime Post was known as The Saviour of the Punjab.

The heinous act that took place in a tranquil meadow in Punjab set us on the path that led inevitably to that momentous day in 1947 where India valiantly won her independence. Even now, 96 years after the slaughter, Jallianwala Bagh is considered by many nationalistic Indians to be the holiest pilgrimage site in the country.

In spite of the unusual temporal uniqueness of the slaughter and the pervasive need to mourn, Jallianwala's brief existence (less than 90 years) as a commemoration and historic place has been fraught with ambiguity and contradiction. When we take into consideration all of these complexity and inconsistencies, we are confronted with challenging concerns about how the past is represented in the current. How does the Jallianwala Bagh Monument specifically symbolize, what does it stand for, and also what assertions does it make? What functions does the monument serve now, and how do they functions connect to its history?

Background

During World War I, British India contributed significantly to the British war effort by providing both men and supplies. About 1.25 million Indian troops and labourers were sent to fight in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East at this period, and the Indian government and Indian princes supplied them with a substantial amount of food, cash, and ammunition. Although, in Punjab and Bengal, anti-colonial sentiment continued to run high. The regional government was virtually rendered ineffective after radical assaults in Bengal and subsequent uprisings in Amritsar.

The concepts for the Hindu-German Mutiny, a pan-Indian uprising against the British Raj, were compiled between 1914 and 1917. The most well-known plan proposed a nationwide uprising inside the British Indian Army in the month of February 1915. In February of 1915, the planned mutiny began. The German Foreign Office and Irish republicans backed the revolutionaries, who included Indian nationalists from Germany, India, and the United States.

The American Ghadar Party, the Indian revolutionary underground in British India, the German Foreign Office, and the San Francisco consulate all conspired to start World War I. The planned rebellion in February was thwarted when British intelligence officers broke into the Ghadarite organisation and kidnapped key members. The Indian military's reaction to mutinies in smaller units and garrisons was just as successful.

The high fatality rates, rising inflation due to excessive taxation, the devastating influenza epidemic of 1918, and the interruption of commerce caused by the war all contributed to an increase in the amount of human misery that occurred in India throughout the First World War. The drawn-out conflict exacted a heavy toll, both monetarily and in terms of the number of lives lost. Indians have been yearning for independence for a very long time, and for a very long time, Over 43,000 Indian troops had already lost their lives while fighting for Britain. In order to combat the reign of the British, Indian troops brought weapons into the country illegally. The Indian nationalist sentiment from before the war was rekindled as modest the Indian National Congress (INC) reconciled their differences and united under a single flag, while hardline factions inside the INC did the same.

General Dyer thought a brutal beating would put an end to the theories, and he was praised in Britain for preventing a terrorist strike. Investigators and historians have identified no conspiracy ties to the events in Amritsar, but such worries nonetheless shaped the British reaction. Returning British Indian Army servicemen from Europe and Mesopotamia found a country in economic decline.

After the failed mutiny attempts in 1915 and the Lahore conspiracy trials, British apprehension lingered. During the Russian Civil War, tales circulated within the armed forces about young Mohajirs who had fought for the Turkish Caliphate and later joined the Red Army. During the fight, these Mohajirs supposedly joined the Red Army. The revolution in Russia had begun to have an effect on the Indian people as well. In 1919, when Gandhi called for outrage against the Rowlatt Act, he sparked a wave of passionate agitation and protests throughout India. This alarmed the British since it coincided with the start of the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Because of railway and telegraph delays and disruptions, as well as problems with the telephone system, the situation in Punjab was rapidly deteriorating. In particular, this was correct.

The majority of army superiors believed a revolt was imminent, therefore they prepared plans for the worst. "There was a gathering of more than 15,000 people in Punjab near Jallianwala Bagh. British Commanding Officer in Punjab Michael O'Dwyer allegedly felt these were early and obvious signs of a plot for a coordinated uprising in May. This may have happened as the British army prepared to leave the highlands for the summer. The Amritsar massacre, and the responses that occurred both before and after it, were not random events, as is often believed; rather, they were the climax of a well crafted plan of retaliation established by the Punjab government to put an end to the scheme". Fear of a Ghadarite rebellion amidst an increasingly tense situation in Punjab allegedly prompted a violent British response that ultimately resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, as stated by historian James Houssemayne Du Boulay. The increasingly volatile situation in Punjab led experts to this conclusion.

Jallianwala Bagh massacre (or the Amritsar massacre)

On April 13, 1919, thousands of Indians, the vast majority of whom were Sikhs, gathered peacefully in Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar, to hear several prominent local leaders speak out against British colonial rule in India and the arrest and deportation of Dr. Satya Pal, Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew, and a few others under the unpopular Rowlatt Act. Attending the meeting to hear these Udham Singh and his orphanage friends were working together to provide water to the crowd. However, O'Dwyer's declaration of martial law was never made public. He had probably made some remarks about it in other parts of town before it occurred, but most people still didn't know about it. Due to the political unrest after the tragedy in Amritsar, it was difficult for him to remain in Punjab for a lengthy period of time. According to his account, he first set foot in India in November 1885 and was then sent to Lahore, the provincial capital of Punjab. By the end of May 1919, I had finally left Lahore and the Punjab for good.

On the same day, General Dyer heard that a massive rally will be held at Jallianwala Bagh. People started trickling into the Bagh at about 2:00 in the afternoon. He received definitive confirmation from the Chief of Police, Rehill, at four o'clock that a crowd of one thousand people had collected at Greenway. Then, Mr. Lewis, the director of Crown Cinema, verified the details. 27 Dyer perceived this as a challenge to his authority. Dyer quickly ordered his attack force to assault the opposing stronghold. Both of his armoured cars were equipped with automatic guns, and he took them along. Dyer led a force of fifty rifles and forty Gurkhas armed with their traditional Kukris towards the City of India Bagh. Briggs and Anderson, two of Dyer's preferred commanders, were also there.

After seeing a sizable number of people congregating in the Valley, General Dyer realized he did not need to wait for anything. He had arrived to the Bagh with such a clear plan in his head and a resolve as strong as iron. It was quite hard to assess the number of the gathering, said Briggs. [Citation needed] I was asked by the General what I believed the figures were, and although I said that it was probably about 5,000, I think that it has been calculated to be more like 25,000. 29 Dyer, who was observing the audience from a lofty perch inside the entryway, was taken aback by the unique makeup of the attendees. Dyer did not believe that it was essential to provide the public with any kind of advance notice. Dyer arranged his forces with 25 Gurkha infantrymen on the left and 25 Baluchi marksmen on the right. All of this took place in the space of a single minute. The land on which the troops stood was elevated in comparison to the surrounding terrain in all directions. After that, the general gave the immediate order for them to begin firing. 30 The throng began to yell very immediately, but those in control assured them there was no need for alarm since the soldiers were just shooting blanks. In a short amount of time, though, they were able to see the reality of the situation as individuals started to collapse and fall. The shooting went on for 10 minutes, during which time 1650 pieces of 303 markings, VI ammunition were discharged, which works out to 33 shots fired from each rifle by each individual. 31 Only when there was no more ammo available did they stop fire.

After the fire stopped, there was nothing to be seen in any part of Bagh other than dead corpses, and this was the case everywhere. The Bagh was crammed with corpses of

various people. One hundred people were severely injured, and they begged for assistance the whole time. Outside of the Bagh, there were a few corpses laying about. It just so occurred that the injured people who sought to flee were unable to live through their ordeal and passed away after making an unsuccessful effort to escape themselves. Dyer made the following testimony to the General Staff on August 25, 1919: I shot and continued to shoot until the mob dispersed. This information comes from Dyer's account. 32 There was no one there to offer them a drink of water. The folks did not have access to any kind of medical help. Even inhabitants of Amritsar who had relatives who had traveled to Bagh were unable to have the courage to go into Bagh for a long time in order to look for their loved ones. The Bagh seemed to be a little battlefield that was littered with a large number of dead bodies and those who had been injured. General Dyer and his army evacuated the Bagh, taking with them a spectacle that resembled horror on earth and the aftermath of their departure. Girdhari Lal, who was present at the incident and had a close view of it, is quoted as saying, I witnessed hundreds of individuals slain on the spot. The fact that shots were fired at the exits via which individuals were trying to flee was easily the most terrifying aspect of the whole ordeal.

India went into a state of panic as word of the tragedy made its way out of Punjab. There was a flood of criticism and condemnation directed at the British administration of India resorting to methods that were immoral, callous, treacherous, and horrific. Several additional seminars and meetings raised concerns about Dyer's action. Politicians and other criminals who had been apprehended and condemned before to or during the time of Martial Law were also called for immediate release.

Historiographer Percival Spear claims that the Jallianwala Bagh massacre was the single most damaging event to Indo-British ties since the Mutiny. When the British colonial government in India was challenged in 1857, an insurrection known as the Mutiny ensued. 34 As an example of how far-reaching the effects of the tragedy were, consider that Rabindranath Tagore resigned his service in the British army after the murders had place. In an open letter to India's Viceroy, Tagore wrote the following. The day has come when honour medals, set against the dissonant background of our debasement, make our shame clear.

Contrarily, the organization's tolerance of General Dyer's conduct was not due to the actions of a single individual but rather to a coordinated set of measures (or inaction). After requesting and receiving approval from their superiors, General Dyer was able to go on with his plans. Major General Beynon and Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the provincial lieutenant governor of the Punjab, both granted their approval. The Indian government seems to have neglected the massacre for five months until it was brought up in the Imperial Legislative Council in September 1919. They agreed to delay General Dyer's judgement until after the hearing of the Hunter Committee even though the statement requested from General Dyer by the commander in chief of the Indian Army was received on 25 August 1919 and the Hunter Committee was not a judicial body qualified to make a legal indictment or judgement. This occurred despite the fact that the Indian Army's top brass had received General Dyer's statement. Lord Midleton, a dissident supporter of the motion, attacked the administration in the following ways after a string of lost opportunities to use good judgement: A

full accounting of the situation led to the Indian government deciding to increase Dyer's dictatorial powers in Punjab. He was sent to the front lines after a month. They promoted him in October, again in January of this year, and then told him in March that they would not be able to keep him on staff. Those who knew all these things but did nothing about them and let it be thought that racial humiliation and fear were tolerated while the emergency was hot are the ones who should be chastised now that public opinion has cooled and they are being accused of supporting racial humiliation and fear. Those who knew about all of these things but did nothing to stop the humiliation and fear should be held accountable.

Montagu, in his capacity as India's Secretary of State, put pressure on the Indian government to investigate the unrest, initially proposing doing so in his budget statement on May 22, 1919. If he had sought to secretly remove Dyer from leadership, he would have been criticised for acting as judge and jury before all the evidence was in. However, the Indian delegation in London exerted pressure on him since he needed their support to enact the reforms he had worked on for three years, starting with the government's promise in 1917. The planning for these changes began in 1917. The safest method to avoid both threats and come up with a common answer is to form a committee made up of official Colonial masters and Indians who are, of course, loyal to the nation. Is there any alternative approach that would have allowed us to achieve both of these aims? On July 18th, he wired the viceroy, "You are intending to organise a committee and have urged me to appoint a chairman. I intend to make a statement before Congress to that effect." This would undoubtedly assuage the concerns of the Indian representatives there.

The Indian government announced on October 14, 1919, that it would establish an investigating panel to look into what had happened in Punjab under Edwin Montagu's directives as the head of the Department of State for India. Originally known as the Disorders Inquest, the Hunter Panel is the most common name today. Its present name honours Lord William Hunter, a former chairman who was Solicitor-General of Ireland and a Senator for the Scottish Council of Justice. According to its mandate, the panel was established to investigate the causes and responses to the recent unrest in Mumbai, Delhi, and Amritsar. The commission was made up of the following individuals:

- Lord Hunter, Chairman of the Commission
- Justice George C. Rankin of Calcutta
- Sir Chimanlal Harilal Setalvad, Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University and advocate of the Bombay High Court
- W.F. Rice, member of the Home Department
- Major-General Sir George Barrow, KCB, KCMG, GOC Peshawar Division
- Pandit Jagat Narayan, lawyer and Member of the Legislative Council of the United Provinces
- Thomas Smith, Member of the Legislative Council of the United Provinces
- Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan, lawyer from Gwalior State
- H.C. Stokes, Secretary of the Commission and member of the Home Department

The Indian government's decision to remove General Dyer from his position was supported by the Hunter Advisory

Board's Majority Document. In July of 1920, Winston Churchill, who was then serving as Secretary of State for War, told the House of Commons that this was the lightest kind of punishment that could have been used. 40 In response to the criticism levelled against Dyer by the Government of India, which was then repeated by the British Panel and the Military Council, Dyer's supporters introduced bills in both houses of parliament in July 1920. If these motions had been approved, it would have been seen as tacit approval of Dyer's action and the known imperial strategy it reflected. The government's handling of the Dyer case, according to the resolution passed by the House of Lords, sets a dangerous precedent in the face of revolt. When appearing before the Hunter Working group—the commission formally ordered by the British Government to begin examining the massacre and what were quaintly characterised as additional disturbances in northern India—Dyer emphasises his uniqueness as a military commander. Dyer establishes his credibility by pointing to his years of service in the military and his accessibility to current events. The British government put Hunter in charge of their commission. 42 He starts his justification of his objectives by emphasising the military mentality with which he attacked their completion. He said, "It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd; rather, it was a problem of having a sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, not just on those who were present but, more specifically, throughout the Punjab." It's impossible to imagine this being too harsh.

An acknowledgement of creative purpose is what Dyer has done with his remarks regarding the slaughter. The term "constructive intent" is used when it can be shown that the defendant knew, or should have known, that their acts would cause harm to others.

From what he said, maintaining the British military's credibility was crucial to maintaining stability in Amritsar and the rest of the Punjab. This was achieved by the use of force to establish colonial masculinity and power over the native population. Dyer, for instance, admits that he would have dispersed the throng without opening fire, but says that he didn't do so because he was afraid the mob would laugh at him. "I believed it would be doing a jolly lot of good and they would learn they were not to be evil," Dyer retorts. It's a rebuttal to the claim that, by opening fire on the mob, he did the British Raj a huge damage. In response to the criticism that he had done the British Raj a huge harm, Dyer makes this statement.

Dyer's admission that the massacre took place is consistent with the concept of constructive purpose as it is often discussed in legal contexts. By "constructive purpose," we mean that the defendant knew or should have known that his or her conduct were likely to cause serious bodily harm to others, if not death. 43 From what he said, maintaining the British military's credibility was crucial to maintaining stability in Amritsar and the rest of the Punjab. This was achieved by the use of force to establish colonial masculinity and power over the native population.

If we take Dyer's admission that he could have dispersed the mob without shooting on it as an example, he adds that he rejected this advice due to his fear of becoming a laughingstock in the eyes of the audience.

After admitting that he may have dispersed the crowd without firing a shot, Dyer offers an explanation. He concedes, "I could disperse them for a bit, but I thought that

I would be making a fool of myself since they would all come back and giggle at me." Due to Dyer's belief in the adult-child narrative of colonial encounters, the mere possibility of this occurring would have made him feel very uncomfortable. 'I believed it would be doing a jolly lot of good and they would learn they were not to be evil,' Dyer retorts. This is in response to the claim that, by opening fire on the mob, he had done a grave injury to the British Raj. This is Dyer's response to the suggestion that he has done a terrible service to the British Raj.

Once he arrived at the Delhi General Offices, he was led to the Commanding Officer's office rather than the Military Director's. 45 The Chief of Staff agreed with the Hunter Committee's judgement, and so General Hudson, who had been waiting outside the antechamber, approached him and told him that he would be stripped of his command. Dyer claimed that he shouldn't be penalised since he hadn't been convicted, but Hudson said it was premature to make such an argument. Also, because Hudson is so upset about it all, he asked Dyer to please avoid upsetting the Commanding Officer. Dyer vowed that he would abstain from doing this. As soon as he reached the Commanding officer's desk, Monroe issued a hasty order for him to resign and told him he would not be rehired by the military. Dyer left without a word.

Three Indians, Jagat Narayan, C.H. Setalvad, and Sultan Ahmad, published a dissenting report on the Hunters Committee, demonstrating the committee's internal divisions. It seems to us that Colonel Dyer made a grave error in that he kept firing for as long as he did, which is something that the majority of the judges found to be cause for strong condemnation. It's easy to understand why the minority view was that the martial law government's use of force was totally unacceptable. They said that despite General Dyer's and Sir Michael O'Dwyer's convictions that they had put down the rebellion, there had been no such outbreak.

War Secretary Winston Churchill and former Prime Minister H. H. Asquith both spoke out against the attack. Both Churchill and Asquith called it hideous, and the latter called it one of the most horrifying events in our nation's history. 48 On July 8, 1920, Winston Churchill delivered the following remark in the House of Representatives: Unless they had bludgeons, the crowd had little chance of survival. It wasn't aimed at anybody or anything in particular. It tried to escape as shots were fired at it to drive a wedge between them, but their efforts were fruitless. Even though there were considerably fewer exits and people were packed in so tightly together that a single bullet could easily pass by three or four bodies, people raced about in a panicked way. The area was much smaller than Tahrir Square. As the fire was concentrated in the area's middle, they fled to the edges. The firefighters then worked to direct the blaze away from the building's perimeter. As the flames were directed downward towards the ground, a large number of individuals hurriedly leapt to safety. A further eight to ten minutes of fire occurred, finally coming to a stop after all ammunition was used up. 49 Parliamentarians voted against Dyer and in favour of the Government after hearing Churchill's comments during the debate in the House of Representatives. There were a final total of 247 in favour and 37 against.

The possibility of a court-martial was eliminated by a clause in the Army Act that said a person may only be tried in a

military court for murder or manslaughter if it had been committed while the defendant was on active duty. Although it may be claimed that obligation in Chandigarh had really been a provider, the Current regime was of the view that both violations should always be dealt by the civil authorities if civil charges were available under the Army Act. This is due to the fact that the Army Act mandated public access to civilian matters. In spite of this, Legal Advisor Edward des Chamier issued a warning that any member of the public might file a complaint against Dyer without any kind of impediment. In such a scenario, the government may step in and dismiss the lawsuit. Montagu admitted this but was keen that more be done to examine the situation than just have Dyer's name removed off the list of unemployed by the Commander-in-Chief in India. To organise his ideas, he wrote down the following statement: "The Government of India is proper to advise not to try Dyer, but to propose dismissal." He must be held to an even higher standard of blame than Hunter for his use of the terrorist notion. At this point, His Majesty can no longer rely on General Dyer for any kind of support. Despite his bravery on the battlefield, he has decided to leave the service because he doesn't believe in the values that drive the military.

Lieutenant General AS Cobb, Montagu's General Secretary, also briefed Montagu of Dyer's personal issues. After losing his work as an officer, Dyer was entitled to collect annual unemployment benefits in the amount of 700 British pounds. He might get this advantage for as long as five years. Cobb, on the other hand, anticipated that Dyer would want to retire at some point and that, in any case (voluntary or involuntary), he would be entitled to a pension. He would no longer get his pension if he were to be dismissed from the service, which could happen only if a military tribunal found in his favour or if the Secretary of the Treasury for War made a recommendation to the King. I gave my two cents to the Department of State for War, which was adamant about its decision to push him into retirement. After much deliberation, the group determined that trying Dyer in a military tribunal was also out of the question. The group decided that Dyer should be criticised for his inaction upon learning about the Jallianwala Bagh rally and not issuing a proclamation or posting a notice. They shot for another 10 minutes and all felt that Dyer deserved criticism for starting the gunfire without warning. The committee met again, but they didn't go far further since Montagu hadn't had time to draught a negotiated solution condemning Dyer. He and Chelmsford were still arguing the Government of India's suggested and applied presentation, so the commission's draught would have to wait.

Everyone involved was able to reach an agreement on the final result. In a telegram to Montagu dated May 3, 1920, the Indian government conveyed its first reactions to the Hunter Study. Even though the Hunter Report had been available for about 2 months, this was their first public remark on the subject. They admitted in the message that the civilian courts shared some of the culpability for saying that they had done so "in such respects as to suggest that they were not going to exert surveillance or advise over the activities of the military commander." The letter clearly states that this is to be the case. They scolded Dyer severely after deciding that the Orders prohibiting assembly should have been disseminated more widely, with special attention

paid to the potential that notices had been posted in Jallianwala Bagh.

Taking a look at how the Dyer case was handled and the verdict itself shows that authorising or tolerating collective violence in bureaucracies is an organisational reaction. The Dyer case is illustrative of how organizations, an institution, such as the Government of India, that is in indebtedness to the social class that it is supposed to be serving is obligated to abide by the galaxy of obligations held by that social class. Even while individual acts of violence against Native Americans were not officially sanctioned, Curzon discovered throughout his tenure as Viceroy that such acts were seldom denounced and almost never prosecuted. When Dyer responded in Jallianwala Bagh to convey the fury of his school, it is not surprising that his classmates supported him because of it.

The attitude of the Government of India in this situation was to neither approve massacre nor subject its personnel to justice in either military or civil tribunals, as was the case with the deputy inspector who shot 65 captured Kuka rebels out of cannons in 1872. The deputy inspector had been treated with the same strict discipline. By avoiding the subject in 1920, the government had made it feasible for Dyer's supporters to try to legitimise a programme that The Times stated was dubbed by Indians preventative slaughter. Because of this, the government allowed Dyer's supporters to try to legitimate a policy. Dyer's supporters capitalised on popular sympathy for him and animosity for Secretary of State Montagu by drawing attention to the alleged violation of Dyer's rights to due process before the Hunter Committee (which was not a judicial body). It was Dyer who was made to seem like the bad guy in this scenario. Their ideology, which was metaphorically described as one of the strong hand of aggressive action by its proponents, was at odds with both British military theory and the standard operating procedure in India at the time. If it had been permitted, it would have been a watershed moment in the development of British empire.

References

1. Banerjee Sikata. *Muscular Nationalism: Gender, Violence, and Empire in India and Ireland, 1914-2004*, New York University, New York and London; c2012.
2. Bose Purnima. *Organizing Empire: Individualism, Collective Agency, and India*, Zubaan; c2003.
3. Brown Emily. (In Book Reviews; South Asia). *The Journal of Asian Studies, Pacific Affairs*, University of British Columbia 1973 May;32(3).
4. Cell John W Hailey. *A Study in British Imperialism, 1872-1969*, Cambridge University Press; c2002.
5. Chandler Malcolm, Wright, John. *Modern World History*, Heinemann Educational Publishers, 2nd Review edition; c2001.
6. Collett Nigel. *The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer*, Continuum International Publishing Group; c2006.
7. Gordon Leonard A. *Portrait of A Bengal Revolutionary*, *The Journal of Asian Studies*. 1968 Feb;27(2).
8. Gupta Amit K, *Defying Death. Nationalist Revolutionism in India, 1897-1938*, *Social Scientist*. 1997 Sep-Oct;25(9-10).
9. Lovett Sir Verney. *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement*, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York; c1920.

10. Mason Philip, Woodruff Philip. The Men Who Ruled India, The Guardians; c2011 Oct 15, 2.
11. Narain Sunita. The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, Lancer Publishers LLC, October 18, 2013, O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, India As I Knew It, Constable & Company, London; c1925.
12. Singh Jaswant. Bloodbath on the Baisakhi, The Tribune; c2002 Apr 13.
13. Spear Percival. The Oxford History of Modern India 1740-1947, Clarendon Press, Oxford; c1965.
14. Tagore renounced his Knighthood in protest for Jallianwala Bagh mass killing, The Times of India; 2011 Apr 13.
15. Talbott Strobe, Engaging India. Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb, Brookings Institution Press; c2004.
16. Townshend Charles. Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century, Faber and Faber; c1986.